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1. 	John Cottingham’s work in moral philosophy is far reaching and has been at the leading edge of some of the most exciting developments in recent research, such as the revival of interest in the concepts of ‘character’ and ‘virtue’, the debate between impartiality and partiality and the role of the emotions in the good life. His most ambitious and innovative contribution to some of these questions is outlined in Philosophy and the Good Life. The book has two main aims, accomplished through an impressive overview of philosophical developments from the Ancient Greeks to modern thinkers: the first is an attack on what Cottingham terms the ratiocentric view of ethics, the second a persuasive case that any plausible answer to what is the good life for humans must take into account the insights of psychoanalysis. 
	The root of ratiocentric ethics is, unsurprisingly, the Platonic confidence in the power of reason. Reason reigns supreme, with the emotions being subjugated to its rule. Cottingham takes us on a journey of the philosophical reliance on reason through history, which shows that this ratiocentric approach pervades the work of most writers. Even those who, like Aristotle, admit to a greater role for the emotions, allowing them to be guided and shaped by reason, are still tied into the Platonic model of human conduct. Even this Aristotelian picture is over-reliant on reason and therefore fails to capture our full humanity. A more realistic conception of humanity should be at the centre of any account of the good life, as opposed to a vain and counter-productive concentration on an ideal and trans-human conception of all-powerful reason.​[1]​
	The second main argument in the book, develops a view of the emotions such that only by accepting the insights of psychoanalysis can we really understand humanity in a way which contributes to the project of elucidating the good life for humans. The psychoanalytic insight, which brings crashing down the ratiocentric account of human nature, is that ‘the influence exerted by unconscious phantasies and desires is such that the full significance of the materials over which reason solemnly deliberates is often not fully transparent to the agent herself’.​[2]​ Reason can never be all powerful, whether one thinks its role is to subjugate, extirpate or rationalize the emotions, because our very own desires, feelings and emotions are fundamentally outside of our understanding.  Fundamentally the ratiocentric model is based on a vain conception of humans as ‘masters of their own house’, fully and consciously in control of their own selves. Psychoanalysis destroys this conception, showing how there can be substantial and influential parts of mental activity that fall short of full reflective awareness. In Cottingham’s words psychoanalysis has effected an expulsion from paradise, but this paradise was illusory in the first instance.​[3]​ Reason is not a supremely authoritative voice, and we should abandon this picture of human nature in favour of a more realistic account of the substantial, non-transparent and possibly unrestrained influences of the emotions.​[4]​

2.	Clearly the main objective of any attack on the ratiocentric conception of ethics is the Platonic account of an all-powerful reason, which harnesses and controls the emotions. As such, this Platonic account is the main target of Cottingham’s dissatisfaction. However, in an impressively nuanced and far-reaching discussion Cottingham shows how the ethical views of many other philosophers are fundamentally flawed by adherence to this Platonic ideal. A sizable portion of this discussion concerns itself with Aristotle’s views (mainly) on ethics.  Cottingham rightly distinguishes the Aristotelian role for reason from the Platonic insistence that the good for man must consist in an exclusive concentration on rational activity. Aristotle’s view is more like rational hegemonism, a view that allows room for both reason and the emotions, but which requires the latter to be guided, shaped and formed by the former. Although differing from Plato’s view, Aristotle still maintains its basic tenets, a fact which becomes apparent in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics when Aristotle returns to and praises the Platonic style supremacy of contemplation. Aristotle’s view is characterised by a naiveté regarding the transparency of the emotions and the possibility of bringing them under the control of reason, with a fundamental commitment to a Platonic-style approach to the centrality and importance of the role of reason.
	Nowhere is this more evident than in Aristotle’s account of akrasia. For Cottingham, Aristotle’s classification of the four states of character as virtue, continence, incontinence and vice is simplistic, falling to capture the complexities of our emotional responses;​[5]​ 
[f]rom our late twentieth-century perspective, we have (rightly) become suspicious of normative models which encourage the dangerous delusion that man can, with impunity, dominate and suppress the world around him – whether the external world of nature, or the complex inner world of the human psyche.​[6]​
 Aristotle’s explanation of how it is possible for an agent to do other than what he judges is best remains tied to the Platonic model, arguing that akratic behaviour is tied to a cognitive defect. This reluctance to free himself from the ratiocentric account of human nature, shows Aristotle’s lack of a proper understanding of the significance and influence of the emotions. Fundamentally he fails to appreciate that reason’s domain is not absolute and the influence of the unconscious means that significant elements of the agent’s own psyche are not fully transparent even to him. The influence of the emotions is such that their full impact is not available to the deliberations of reason, is not transparent at the time of making decisions and may even not be revealed later on. This Aristotelian insistence on controlling what is potentially unknowable creates not just a false picture but threatens ‘to cut us off from the roots of what makes us most endearingly vulnerable and most fully human.​[7]​
	It seems almost as if Cottingham is more concerned with making his case against Aristotle than Plato, as the Platonic view of the predominance of reason is easily discredited and fairly widely accepted as extreme, whereas the Aristotelian picture is more appealing as being more inclusive, plausible and realistic. However, this appeal is misguided and therefore potentially more distracting. By stepping down from the more extreme forms of ratiocentricity, Aristotle’s position may appear a more plausible account of human nature, however it still retains its ties to the centrality of reason while at the same time failing to fully appreciate the unknowable nature of the emotions. This seems to make it a more significant target than the Platonic claim and one that it is more important to defeat.
	In this paper I wish to present an alternative account of akrasia; one which explains the Aristotelian attachment to a fundamental role for reason in a non-corrosive manner and which allows for a more fundamental role for the emotions, which may be more compatible with some of Cottingham’s claims for them. In a sense, this is an interpretation of some Aristotelian ideas, which will attempt to present them as more attuned to Cottingham’s project. Cottingham does hint that a radial reconstruction of Aristotle’s ethics could develop a picture more compatible with these modern insights that have led us to loose confidence in the power of reason​[8]​. It would be foolhardy to claim that I will offer such a complete and comprehensively radical reconstruction, but perhaps I can offer some hints as to how Aristotle may be interpreted in such a direction. All questions of interpretation require precise attention to detail and exegetical analysis, even more so for a topic as complex and disputed as akrasia. To an extent I will try to refer to passages in Aristotle’s work which support the case I will construct, but I will also rely on referring to the work of others who have constructed a better case than I possibly could for the interpretation of particular points.

3. 	Let us begin where Aristotle begins with the Socratic claim that no one acts knowingly contrary to what is best, they only do so through ignorance. This Socratic claim seems to be the pinnacle of the Platonic reliance on reason and the importance of knowledge in an account of the good life. Although Aristotle starts off his discussion of akrasia in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics by accepting that such a claim is manifestly contrary to plain evidence,​[9]​ he does conclude his discussion by accepting a modified version of it.​[10]​ I will go on to consider Aristotle’s modifications to the claim and their significance, but before doing so, it is important to consider the Socratic claim itself, and its appeal. Cottingham’s work has encouraged us to view the distorting and unrealistic implications of this ratiocentric approach, but I think it is important to begin by spelling out some of the reasons for its appeal in this context. 
	Following a significant piece of work on weakness of will​[11]​ most commentators see the central problem here as being about a failure to convert intention into action. This is explicitly not a particular problem relevant to morality, but a general concern about cases where an agent believes that something should be done (has the opportunity to do it) and fails to do so. Although I am happy to accept that weakness of will is a phenomenon wider than that present in moral cases, I think it is a mistake to subsume the moral instances of akrasia under the general cases of failures to turn intentions into actions. It is important to consider the moral case as a special case of weakness of will and why this is the case should become apparent if we consider the appeal of the Socratic dictum. 
	The specific case of weakness of will which has to do with moral akrasia, is concerned with cases where the agent knows what ought to be done, this is a moral ‘ought’, but does not do it. It is crucial to note here that the subject of the agent’s knowledge is the moral good. The Socratic ‘knows what is best’ refers to wishes and choices that derive from conceptions of eudaimonia, so this is a moral conception of what is best or what is good.​[12]​ What motivates the Socratic claim is that the agent’s knowledge is of the moral good, for how can one know what one ought to do and still not do it? Morality exerts an attraction, such that it is difficult to conceive of the possibility of being receptive to this attraction and simply ignoring it.​[13]​ Cases of weakness of will in general may be perplexing, but cases of akrasia, whose subject is moral knowledge, are particularly perplexing, and perplexing in a special way that has to do with the object of the agent’s knowledge. The basic Socratic claim is that human beings always most desire and hence pursue what is best; these being moral concepts, understood by reference to eudaimonia. Knowing what is best morally and not pursuing it, therefore seems impossible because of this connection between evaluation and motivation, so the akratic must be ignorant.​[14]​
	Now, let us consider this claim in Aristotelian terms and see whether there is any evidence for us to think that Aristotle would find it appealing. Eudaimonia is the end of human action, Aristotle tells us:
that which is choosable for its own sake and never because of something else we call final without any qualification. Well, eudaimonia more than anything else is thought to be just such an end, because we always choose it for itself and never for any other reason…A self-sufficient thing, then, we take to be one which by itself makes life desirable and in no way deficient; and we believe that eudaimonia is such a thing. What is more, we regard it as the most desirable of all things, not reckoned as one item among many; if it were so reckoned, eudaimonia would obviously be more desirable by the addition of even the least good, because the addition makes the sum of goods greater, and the greater of two goods is always more desirable. Eudaimonia, then is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed.​[15]​
Since practical wisdom is a correct conception of the end of human action, eudaimonia, how can the dictates of practical wisdom ever be ignored and not carried through into action? How can one know what practical wisdom requires and not be moved to do so? Surely the conclusions of all practical deliberation should in some way speak in favour of performing an action, but we can, in general, accept that things may go wrong between arriving at these conclusions and affecting them in practice. However, the conclusions of practical wisdom are the subject for the sake of which everything else is done and which is chosen, chosen for its own sake and chosen knowingly so there should be no gap between deliberation and action. To use Wiggin’s words: ‘For a man to embrace a specific conception of eudaimonia just is for him to become susceptible to certain distinctive and distinctively compelling reasons for acting in certain sorts of ways’.​[16]​
	The relevant state of character for understanding this point is virtue. In the case of virtue, deliberation flows smoothly into action, illustrating the full appeal of the noble and the good​[17]​. If the possibility of the incontinent agent is the one that posses all the problems, then the state of character of the virtuous agent should be easier to understand as this is the unproblematic case. The virtuous agent is characterised by a special sensitivity to relevant features of the situation, a perceptual capacity, which allows him to reliably ‘see’ what is required and, more importantly combined with practical wisdom, why it is required of him. The very instance of perceiving these morally salient features incorporates a motivational element, since virtue is by its definition a purposive disposition, a tendency to respond to relevant circumstances with the right reason and the appropriate desire, which result in the right action. Indeed, that the situation requires the appropriate response (for example a situation which requires a kind response) is a full and adequate account of the agent’s motivation to so act, and any other incentive to so act (for example to gain a personal advantage) actually disqualify the agent from being virtuous. Indeed McDowell argues that the demands of virtue are not one of many reasons which must be set against each other, but rather the only salient aspects of the situation and all other reasons are as a result are silenced.​[18]​
	This explains the appeal of the Socratic claim. Since the object of our concern is the noble and the good, any account of human action must incorporate the idea of the attractiveness of morality. Given that, it is indeed perplexing how one can know what one (morally) ought to do and still not do it.

4.	All this may explain Aristotle’s attraction to the Socratic claim, but, of course, means that Aristotle (and indeed Socrates) now has a problem with explaining the possibility of akrasia. Aristotle frequently asserts that the virtuous, continent and incontinent agents all share in the right principle,​[19]​ but if they all know and therefore all feel the attraction of morality, why do two of them, the virtuous and the continent, act and one does not, the incontinent. And, further, why does the continent agent only act after a struggle with contrary motivations? There are a limited number of possible answers to this question. One, as we have seen, is to accept the Socratic conclusion that the incontinent must be acting in ignorance. This kind of answer requires full faith in the power of reason to control recalcitrant elements in the psychological make-up of human beings and is the most vulnerable to the sorts of concerns Cottingham raises against the ratiocentric model. 
	Another suggestion is that the incontinent agent is somehow cognitively deficient. If affirmation of the practical syllogism must, of necessity, result in action, if an agent fails to display the action then he cannot be said to have knowledge.​[20]​ However, such a view cannot be attributed to Aristotle as it is incompatible with many of his remarks on how the akratic shares in the right principle and the idea that akrasia (and continence) involves struggle.​[21]​
	Yet another possibility is to see akrasia as a struggle between reason and emotion. Reason pulls in the direction of the good, emotions are wayward and derail the process that would have otherwise ended in action. The incontinent agent, in this picture, fully appreciates the demands of morality but is swayed by contrary desires to do otherwise. This explains continence as a similar case of struggle, but one that the agent wins over his emotions. This seems exactly like the sort of confrontational picture of reason set against the emotions that Cottingham cautions us against. However, we needn’t worry as this picture makes little sense given what we have said so far. Since morality exerts an attraction, in this account, cases of incontinence are cases where a competing motivational pull, that of desires, wins the day. For this to be possible we would have to assume that either the motivational pull of morality is weak or the desires are extremely strong. However, both these options are problematic. It is implausible to accept that morality exerts an attraction, but insist that it is a rather weak one. For how could recognition of the noble and the good be attractive but only mildly so, given that the object of the attraction is the noble and the good? On the other hand, we could accept that the attraction of morality is appropriately significant, but develop a picture of human nature as literally ravaged by contrary, extreme desires. However, even if such a picture were plausible in itself, it would then be difficult to explain continence and virtue. For if such desires are so overwhelmingly strong, how can the struggle ever be won (the continent agent) or the desires ever be extinguished (the virtuous agent)?
	These thoughts seem to bring us back where we started, for if some people understand the demands of morality, but still do otherwise, we have to assume that this understanding is incomplete. However, we can explain this problem with the account of the akratic agent’s knowledge without having to commit to a strict division between reason and the emotions. Indeed the picture of the akratic as lacking in the full and complete knowledge which characterises the virtuous agent, can only be understood if we abandon the confrontational model of reason and desires.

 5.	Let us start by considering what happens in the, perhaps more straightforward, case of virtue. Aristotle warns us that, in moral matters, failure is possible in many ways, whereas success is only one.​[22]​ It is easier to miss the target than hit it, but for our purposes it should be helpful to start with an account of virtue as there is only one way in which one is virtuous. 
	Virtue, then, is a purposive disposition concerned with choice. The virtuous agent is characterised by having the right reason, in accordance with the right desire, so that his practical deliberations flow smoothly into the right action. That virtue is a purposive disposition reveals a lot about the role of desires in the virtuous agent. We are moved with respect to our desires, but we are disposed in respect to the virtues.​[23]​ This tells us something both about the nature of desires and the role they play in the character of the virtuous person. Desires are diverse, changing and can move us to act in many different ways, whereas dispositions are settled, entrenched and stable tendencies with respect to specific emotions. Thus, one can be moved at different times by different, transient and fleeting desires, and this is what desires do, that is, they move us. However, virtues involve stable, reliable dispositions with respect to appropriately trained and dependable desires. The virtuous agent is characterised by reliability, that is, he can be reliably expected to act consistently in situations, which require a virtuous response. He has settled dispositions with respect to the virtues, which means that can be counted upon to have the appropriate feelings as elicited by the appropriate situations.
	This does suggest a level of control over one’s emotions and indeed the Aristotelian picture of moral development points towards such a conclusion. For Aristotle moral development involves a long, time-consuming and difficult process of sensitisation to moral requirements. We will go on to consider exactly what this process involves below, but for now we can accept that through a process of education, training, habituation and realisation of the noble and the good, virtuous agents come to have settled dispositions to behave in particular ways. They are no longer moved by whatever desires they happen to have, in unrelated ways, but are disposed to react in the right manner, towards the right people, with the right emotions. The virtuous agent’s emotions are not emotions he happens to have, which happen to move him in different ways, but cultivated dispositions, chosen and developed because of the ways they affect the agent’s motivation. Thus dispositions are fixed, cultivated and sensitised emotional tendencies to feel and act in appropriate ways, which have been developed and promoted because of the sorts of tendencies that they are. This is a picture of the emotions as settled dispositions, working in accordance with reason and flowing smoothly into action. We now need to say a bit more on how this is achieved and on exactly what is the relationship between reason and the emotions.
	Virtue is a purposive disposition concerned with choice and determined by the right reason (orthos logos). To say that someone is virtuous is to say that they have a reliable sensitivity to the requirements of virtue. A kind agent is a person who is moved to respond in kind ways to situations that require a kind response. It is the situation itself which generates the requirement for the virtuous response, and accounting for why that is can only be done by referring back to the particulars of the situation. That is, if one were to ask why is a kind response the correct response in this instance, the only possible answer would have to make reference to particular features of this situation that generate the requirement for kindness, for example he is in pain or she is hurt. It is by giving an account of the situation one is faced with that we can explain why the requirement for a virtuous response is generated, and the virtuous person is the person who can perceive what these requirements are, how they are generated, and is able to respond to them with the appropriate emotion. At the same time, specific virtues can only be understood by reference to the situations which give rise to the requirement for this appropriate response and therefore in light of the appropriate response (the virtuous action). Above we explained the virtue of kindness in these terms, but see also, for example, Aristotle’s account of ‘favour’. Favour is defined both in terms of the benevolent feelings appropriate to it and the resulting action that has to do with rendering a service, a service to one who needs it; thus linking the kind of action that is appropriate, with the particular circumstances that generate the need for a favour. The circumstances which explain the appropriateness of acting benevolently in rendering the favour are, as we would expect, varied: from a small favour in response to a moderate need though to a pressing or great need, or a favour difficult to achieve, or one which only one person can grant, or an agent who is the first person to do so, or who has done so to the highest degree.​[24]​
Crucial to this account is this perceptual capacity to ‘see’ morally salient features, this ‘situational appreciation’ to use Wiggin’s term. The requirements of virtue cannot be fully captured in advance of coming across particular situations that generate them, nor can they be encapsulated in rigid or overriding rules. It is only when faced with the situation requiring the appropriate response, that the virtuous agent can perceive what that appropriate response should be and this is further supported by Aristotle’s emphasis on education through habit, training and action. For it is only when we expose ourselves to appropriate situations and try to act in appropriate ways that we will come to see why they are appropriate and therefore why they are required. The process of moral education is exactly this process of exposure to the right response, so that we come to appreciate why particular reasons are special calls for action and should affect us in particular ways. Crucially, reason and emotion need to be working together, working in a particular way that implies co-operation rather than subjugation, in order for this capacity of situational appreciation to be exercised.
We now need to consider in more detail Aristotle’s account of the emotions. It seems that, in general, there are competing accounts of the role of the emotions, particularly in relation to reason. In some of these accounts the emotions are presented as wild forces, outside the scope and control of reason, which must be eliminated and whose demands one must become entirely immune to. A slightly more useful role for the emotions has them as in principle contrary, but possibly open, to the direction of reason. Thus, the emotions should be controlled, limited, subjugated by reason. Yet a more co-operative picture sees the emotions as open to rational persuasion, amenable to training and development so that they can be useful allies to reason. Finally, another possibility is that the emotions are crucial parts of rational deliberation and the good life cannot be achieved without a full recognition of their importance and contribution. In general, Aristotelian commentators tend to emphasise his acceptance of the emotions as possible allies to reason, provided they are trained and habituated in appropriate ways and tend to present this as one of the advantages of his approach, often in opposition to rival methods of thinking. However, I suspect that an astute commentator could find textual evidence for almost all of the above positions on the emotions in Aristotle’s work and I think this is because it is a mistake to present his position on the emotions as unitary. Aristotle warns us not to expect precision from our subject matter, he warns us that we will need an acquaintance with psychology if we are to inquire into human goodness,​[25]​ so why do should we expect a single, neat and tidy answer to the question of the relation between reason and the emotions?
	Let us distinguish between three kinds of desires (desires in general, orexis): emotions (pathe), appetites/sensual appetites (epithumiai) and rational wish (boulesis).​[26]​  In the virtuous person emotion acts in accord with reason, both motivating the agent towards the right action, while right action flows unimpeded from the agent’s deliberation. By emotion here I mean the pathe. Aristotelian moral development involves a long process of habituation, education and training through which the student of virtue moves from starting points, ‘the that’, to understanding ‘the because’. This process of gradual development is neither exclusively cognitive nor exclusively emotional, but also, neither are these two separate dimensions which come together in virtue, but rather reason and the emotions are engaged in an entirely inter-twined and inter-dependent process, each shaping the other’s development.
	This is an important point to make, as the relationship between reason and the emotions should not be characterised by a picture which presents one of these two elements as overpowering the other, or as having relative merits which must be preserved at the cost of the other approach, or as in any way as a rival, confrontational or antagonistic account where one element struggles to get the ‘upper hand’ over the other. Rather reason refines and influences our affective responses, while the emotions colour and shape our rational judgments. Coming to see the world is a matter of both emotions and reason. Our emotions colour how we perceive the world and, though moral imagination and empathy, allow us to make sense of what we perceive. The judgments we make are influenced by our emotional understanding and are shaped by the insights afforded to us by the emotions.​[27]​ For example, the judgment that someone needs assistance is intimately tied with an emotional response to the perception of that person’s pain; it is the feeling of sympathy at another person’s suffering that generates the thought that assistance is required here. At the same time our emotions are influenced by our judgments. For example, the realisation that someone’s suffering is the result of a well deserved, just punishment will put an end to any emotions of sympathy towards him. Reason will shape the type of emotional response based on the appropriateness of its judgments, for example, we are moved to pity when the misfortune suffered is underserved but rejoice at good fortune that is deserved.​[28]​ This is an emotional response that is directly influenced by a judgment regarding the merit of the good fortune and one that can radically change in focus through a new understanding of what is happening in this particular case. Our emotional responses should be appropriate, that is they should be related in the appropriate way to the correct judgment of what it is we perceive. 
	It is through both reason and emotion that we view the world, understand what it is we are seeing, evaluate it and respond to it.​[29]​ And it is through both reason and emotion that we move from mere beginnings, ‘the that’, beyond knowledge to full understanding, ‘the because’. Coming to understand ‘the because’ is coming to fully appreciate why ‘the that’ was required in the first place, but this is not a different kind of knowledge, that is, one lower level, the other higher level, but a different kind of understanding of the same things, a full appreciation of the noble and the good, which includes an internalisation of the noble and the good. This is what is involved in saying that virtue involves choice and choice of the good means choosing it knowingly and for its own sake.
	For Aristotle reasoning and emotion combine to produce choice, the result of which is action.​[30]​ So choice is neither exclusively reason, nor exclusively emotion, nor is it the subjugation of emotion by reason, rather ‘choice is either appetitive intellect (orectikos nous) or intellectual appetition (orexis dianoitiki); and man is a principle of this kind’,​[31]​ by which he means that man is a union of reason and emotion that causes action. It is interesting to note that Aristotle chooses to give us both formulations, both ‘appetitive intellect’ and ‘intellectual appetite’, in a sense refusing to give primacy to either reason or emotion. He also makes choice rather than action central in determining character, a point he will need to distinguish between the virtuous and the continent man latter on.
	Finally, one more relevant concept here is the idea of rational wish (boulesis).  Practical reason (nous) alone is not sufficient for producing movement, but when action results from practical reason then this also involves rational wish. Rational wish is aimed at the good, for we do not wish for anything unless we think it is good,​[32]​ and it is not connected to the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain like all the other emotions. Since wish can be directed by reason, if we reason to the noble and the good, our rational wish will be aimed at the noble and the good and it is characteristic of the man of virtue that his rational wish aims at the noble and the good.​[33]​ Thus, whereas emotions may aim at all sorts of pleasures, wish is the rational longing for the noble and the good.
	The virtuous man then perceives and judges everything correctly, having both the right reason and the right desire, his choice affirms the truth of what he has affectively deliberated about, becoming the standard of what is noble and good, which is exactly what his rational wish aims for.​[34]​ His deliberation, wish and choice are expressions of his character, that is, they are, in different ways, intrinsically connected to the noble and the good and his virtue displays itself in his action which proceeds unimpeded from his character. As we would expect from our original discussion concerning the appeal of the moral good, we do not need to ask how motivation is possible given the agent’s deliberation, choice and wish, rather motivation comes about through the agent’s understanding of the noble and the good. Coming to understand the good is tantamount to coming to see, coming to be persuaded, and coming to be motivated to do the good, hence to choosing the good. In this sense ‘understanding’ is a technical term, involving perception, appreciation, affirmation and motivation by the noble and the good.

6.	So much for what should be the unproblematic case of the virtuous agent, but given all this, how can we make sense of the akratic? Now it would be a mistake to think that all akratic behaviour is one unified phenomenon. Aristotle himself distinguishes a number of ways in which one can be akratic in Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.​[35]​ I will concentrate on two interpretations of what might be occurring when agents act akratically, one has to do with the development in the relationship between reason and the emotions, the pathe, the other with the role of epithumiai.
	We need to give an account of knowledge in the virtuous, continent and incontinent agents. For, the way we characterised akrasia at the beginning means that we still need to account for how it is possible for the akratic to have knowledge but to act against it, especially since the knowledge in question is knowledge of the noble and the good. The answer to this seems to be that Aristotle means more than one thing when he speaks of knowledge and admits to many distinctions to the idea. Book VII starts with the Socratic dictum to emphasise the attraction of morality, but his attraction is only effective on those on whom it is felt, that is, the virtuous agents. The incontinent agent possesses knowledge in the sense of knowing what is right, but not in the sense of being disposed to do what is right,​[36]​ which gives a good indication of at least two ways in which one can have knowledge. What Aristotle means when he claims that the incontinent man knows what is right in the sense of actively contemplating it but only as a man who is asleep or drunk is said to know without exercising this knowledge,​[37]​ is that the link between knowledge, understanding, choice and motivation is broken. This is mere knowledge, without the motivational appeal of the noble and the good which comes through such knowledge, without the choice being made knowingly and for the sake of the chosen and without the rational wish aiming at that which the virtuous agent aims at. 
	Interestingly, this is also the difference between the continent agent and the virtuous agent, in that the continent also knows but is not disposed in the proper sense of the word. Proper dispositions result unhindered into action, whereas the continent action is the result of struggle. In this sense the continent cannot be said to be disposed to act in accordance with the right reason, rather, although he does act rightly it is only as a result of winning the struggle. On another occasion, were he to lose the struggle, he would not perform the right act.
	However, it is fair to ask a further question: why is it that the virtuous agent knows in the full sense of the word, whereas the others do not? In what respect is the knowledge of the continent and incontinent agents lacking? When we considered the virtuous agent we painted a picture of choice as the result of both reason and emotion, affecting each other and shaping the outcome of deliberations. Perhaps the fault of the continent and incontinent agents is insufficient moral maturity. That is, virtue is the end product of a long process of development, while continence and incontinence are earlier stages on this developmental road. For example, developing the emotional sensitivity required to bring salient moral features to the attention of reason in the proper manner, is a difficult task and immature agents are unlikely to have mastered it in its entirety. The incontinent agent’s vision is obscured, like that of the drunk or the sleeping, because it has not been fully properly developed. Like a student who merely parrots what he knows, the incontinent does not fully understand what he knows, and coming to understand requires both rational and emotional development. Hints of the proper understanding of this knowledge can come through (and surely this will be a gradual process, with set-backs, dependent on the circumstances one comes across, the temptations one is exposed to, the different ways in which the different aspects of one’s natural tendencies develop, and so on.) and these will be instances when continence wins the struggle. Thus, Aristotle can conclude: ‘…that the Socratic dictum ‘Nothing is mightier than wisdom’, is right. But in that by ‘wisdom’ he meant ‘knowledge’, he was wrong; for wisdom is a form of goodness, and is not scientific knowledge but another kind of cognition’.​[38]​ This wisdom (which we have termed ‘understanding’ and contrasted with knowledge) requires both rational and emotional judgment and, through choice, involves being motivated to pursue the noble and the good.
	So much for the first interpretation of akratic action, which has to do with the development of the relationship between reason and emotion. Previously we mentioned epithumiai as a species of desire and it is now time to return to this idea. We have said that emotions are intricately connected with reason, affecting judgments and being affected by them, however epithumiai are different. Epithumiai are an irrational species of desire having to do with natural desires, such as the desire for food, thirst, hunger, sexual pleasure and generally desires having to do with the senses.​[39]​ Unlike rational desires (which include emotions and rational wish), which are open to rational conviction, that is, we can come to have them when convinced that something is pleasurable, one cannot be talked out of one’s epithumiai. Rational desires are modified and may even come into existence or cease to exist based on the judgments of reason, for example you can convince a person not to act on his anger by pointing out how the object of his anger is undeserved. But one’s epithumiai persist, for example one remains hungry until he eats and before that he cannot be rationally talked out of his hunger, although they are amenable to reason in another sense, that is, one can be talked out of acting on their epithumia, for example one can be persuaded not to eat even when hungry.​[40]​
	Now most of these remarks on epithumiai occur in the Rhetoric which does not touch on the topic of akrasia, but I think that they can help illuminate the discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics, for it is the term ‘epithumiai’ which is used when explaining how weakness of will is possible when appetite becomes the principle from which the akratic acts.​[41]​ Epithumetic appetites are particularly strong, natural desires, which are not amenable to reason, exactly the sorts of things one would expect should be able to exert contrary influences. Appetites associated with our need for food, drink, sex, and all our senses are a good candidate for the kinds of desires that can subvert one’s purpose and take over, resulting in akratic behaviour.​[42]​ Epithumetic incontinence then is like an opportunistic infection, a strong, natural, irrational desire (alogos orexis) which waits its opportunity to manifest itself and take over, resulting in incontinent action. All epithumia needs is a mere hint of pleasure from the senses to rush off towards it.​[43]​ It is important that what we have here is ‘a mere hint from the senses’ rather than a rational judgment, as epithumiai are not amenable to reason like other emotions. Consider how anger is compared to a hasty servant who hears the instruction of his master but in his hurry to carry it out hears half of it, or a guard dog who barks too quickly before he can ascertain whether the person at the door is a friend or foe​[44]​. Unlike anger which listens to reason but not always clearly, epithumiai are influenced not by judgement but by mere impression of the world, the impression of pleasure.
	This accounts for why akrasia is a temporary condition, one that the agent can ‘wake up’ from or ‘recover’ from as in the case with drunkenness,​[45]​ since when the pleasure ends the epithumia for it also comes to an end. If epithumiai are not amenable to reason, we cannot expect them to be habituated, trained or made to fit with the prescriptions of reason. Furthermore, given that epithumiai concerns themselves with fundamental desires, desires for food, drink, sex, and so on., it would also seem implausible to assume that they are eradicated in the virtuous man. Does that mean then that even the virtuous man is subject to the whimsical influence of the epithumiai? The answer here is that although we cannot control their existence or their aim, we can control whether they manifest themselves in action, an idea that corresponds to our understanding of what strength of will should be all about. The virtuous man has not eradicated his epithumiai, in the sense of not having any, but he can control whether they manifest themselves into action in accordance with the right principle.​[46]​

7.	We should now return to Cottingham’s objection to the Aristotelian emphasis on the power of reason and ask to what extent can we hold Aristotle to the charge of ratio-centricity. If we allow due weight to the influence and nature of epithumiai, as well as understanding the co-operative and mutually dependant relationship between reason and emotions, I think we will find that Cottingham’s charge has less of an impact on Aristotle.
	Epithumetic desires are by their nature strong and difficult to control, given that they are concerned with fundamental human drives. As such they play a crucial role in the phenomenon of weakness of will, subverting the dictates of reason. We have developed an account of akrasia such that it is these epithumetic desires for food, drink and sex that create the very problem of how an agent can know what is best and still not do it, allowing epithumetic desires to play a crucial role in our understanding of moral psychology. The ratio-centric model may be strong here and we may discern Platonic influences,​[47]​ but this is only in respect with these particular kinds of desires, the epithumiai. At the same time, although there is a ratio-centric shape to this project of controlling these types of desires, it is important to note that Aristotle has a special place for them. He distinguishes these particularly strong desires for food, drink and sex and gives them a unique role in his account of the relationship between reason and desires. He also acknowledges that they can never be controlled as such, in that their existence cannot be affected by reason, the best we can hope for is for reason to determine whether we should act on them or not.
	The interaction between reason and emotions, the pathe, entirely defies the conception of the ratio-centric model. Aristotle is not concerned to expunge these emotions, or to blindly subjugate them to the power of reason, rather presents a co-operative and, more than this, interdependent picture of reason and emotion. Emotions shape the kinds of reasons that we have, while reasons change our emotions, both elements, emotions and reason, required for moral perception and choice and therefore for being properly motivated by an understanding of the noble and the good. The Aristotelian picture sees emotions play a full and equal part in what is required in coming to understand the noble and the good. At the same time, this account of the emotions does not share, in its entirety, the ratio-centric faith in the ultimate power of reason, as virtue can only be found at the end of a long and difficult road and may indeed be more of an ideal than an actuality.
	This interpretation of akrasia is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it does away with the standard picture of the belief/desire model, a modern account of reason and desire that has come to dominate our interpretations of Aristotle. As we have seen the Aristotelian picture rejects this idea of two separate and rival forces, rather, integral to the notions of ‘choice’ and ‘virtue’ is an account of appetitive intellect or intellectual appetition.  Secondly, it may well be that the account of virtue proper is an ideal, one which beings as vulnerable and fragile as us can never achieve. This means that the good life is never fully under the control of reason, but Aristotle did not expect it to be nor does he see virtue as a struggle to bring about rational control. The good life is to be found at the interplay of reason and desire; it is fragile and susceptible to the vagaries that affect the inter-development of our affective and rational capacities.
	We have, then, two interpretations of akrasia. The first has to do with epithumiai, appetitive desires associated with food, drink and sex, which are not amenable to reason in the sense of being able to be shaped by reason like pathe. The influence of these appetites can distort the dictates of reason so that they do not result in action, although it is possible to learn to control not so much the appetites themselves (that is, whether they are present) but rather whether they result in action. The second interpretation of akrasia has to do with the relationship between reason and emotions, the pathe, which can be habituated and educated to flow smoothly into the right action, but which is a long and arduous process, open to set-backs and struggle, a struggle which is exhibited in continence and incontinence.
	Although we have not said much on this specifically we can conclude some remarks on psychoanalysis and Aristotle. Clearly Aristotle has no account of the unconscious, but this does not necessarily mean that he should be read as assuming all desires to be immediately or easily fully transparent to reason. A certain kind of desire, epithumiai, play a critical role and one of the main desires of this kind is the desire for sexual pleasure, which, contra Cottingham, allows Aristotle to be interpreted in a way that is more compatible with psychoanalytic accounts of the centrality of sexual desires in our psychological make-up. Epithumiai are deep, strong desires that are not under the control of reason and, although there is no explicit evidence of this thought in Aristotle’s writings, we might plausibly assume that the thought that epithumiai could be entirely inaccessible to reason is not incompatible with what Aristotle does say about them. To further develop an Aristotelian metaphor, perhaps one’s epithumiai are hidden from reason in the same way that one’s full knowledge is hidden from a drunken man due to his drunkenness. There is something about these kinds of desires that makes them both inaccessible to reason and explains why they are inaccessible due to their very nature, they distort what reason can perceive, including their own presence. 
	Furthermore, the claim that the road to virtue is long, arduous, subject to set-backs and by no means certain, can be read to suggest that even pathe are, at times, more compatible with a psychoanalytic view of reason than Cottingham claims. If the emotions shape reason in as much as reason shapes emotions, then inappropriate emotions will cloud reason and may even cloud reason with respect to the true nature of these very emotions. The claim that there is such a thing as moral progress indicates that the agent can come to see through this ‘cloud’ to the noble and the good, but this is a difficult process and one which is not won by reason triumphing over the emotions. 

8.	Cottingham’s concern with the Aristotelian picture of the relationship between reason and desires seems to be three-fold. In the first instance Aristotle’s view is characterised by a naiveté regarding the transparency of the emotions, which is demonstrably wrong in light of the psychoanalytic insights. Secondly, despite Aristotle’s more compatible account of the relationship, his overall approach is one of optimism that the emotions can be brought under the control of reason. Finally, as a corollary of this optimism there is the thought that errant emotions can be rehabilitated, re-establishing the agent as ‘master in his own house’. As we have seen Aristotle has, at least a partial, defence to these claims. Although clearly Aristotle does not recognise the full force of the unconscious, his account of epithumiai as we have read it allows for strong and deeply routed emotions which can never come under the control of reason in terms of being extirpated. And even if the final picture of virtue is one of harmony, this is only achieved through a long and arduous process that betrays the fragility not only of reason but also of the emotions. For, the development from continence and incontinence to virtue requires true co-operation between the right reason and the right emotion, those aimed at the noble and the good, with cognitive judgments shaping emotional responses and emotions determining how we reason about the world. Finally, there is the question of the extent to which reason can master the affairs of the emotions. On this, I think there is even closer convergence between Cottingham’s position and Aristotle’s, although we do need to reconsider Cottingham’s claim.
	Cottingham’s challenge to the dominance of reason makes use of the idea that human lives are subject to the vagaries of fortune. Psychoanalysis introduces fortune in our desires, which lead down avenues we can’t foresee or control, at odds with the picture of all-powerful reason controlling the passions. The Freudian insight is that ‘the area of ‘fortune’ – the recalcitrant residue over which rational choice has no control – extends inwards to the very core of our being. The complexities of the human psyche, the opaque and intensely problematic character of our deepest motivations, mean that the deeper significance of the very goods we strive for, the very plans we construct, is often obscured even from the strivers and constructors themselves’.​[48]​ A linear picture of rational progression is rejected, replaced by a picture of past events being understood in the light of present revelations. Humans suffer from hubris, an arrogance of deliberative rationality in believing that it is possible to have access to and evaluate all the relevant information when making a moral decision. This information only becomes available through genuine, deeper awareness and suffering which comes after the decision has been made.
The psychoanalytic insight is based on the importance of discovery. Motives, passions and influences operate at the time when we make our decisions, but they are hidden from us, unconscious. Psychoanalysis helps us to discover these hidden influences, as it involves ‘…a long process of recovery, rehabilitating those parts of the self which are initially submerged beneath the level of ordinary everyday awareness’​[49]​ where ‘…the subject aims finally to unmask himself, to be at last faithful to the hidden truth of his desire, to recover the disassociated fragments of the self, and in so doing transform his self-understanding’.​[50]​ The time dimension is important here since we are not restricted to the specific act in two ways: on the one hand many of our influences stem from our childhood and have their roots deeply in our past, on the other hand many of these influences are so deeply hidden that they can only be uncovered in the future. Thus, an overview of a whole life, as opposed to a ‘slice’ of time, is important.
	However, both these points, the vagaries of fortune and the difficulties of discovering our own inner selves, form part of Aristotle’s insight. Others have argued much more persuasively than I could here,​[51]​ that the picture of human goodness Aristotle presents is fragile and vulnerable. This vulnerability stems precisely from the kinds of creatures human beings are and from the fragility of the project itself. Aristotle warns us that we will need to be exposed to the right influences at an early age, develop the right habits, be educated in the ways of virtue and count on a bit of luck for all this to go favorably before we have any chance of developing our reasoning and emotional responses in the right direction. Virtue requires the right emotions at the right time towards the right people for the right reason, but it is easy to miss and failure comes in many ways.​[52]​ Although Aristotle talks about one way as the way of virtue, there are many ways in which things can go wrong and he frequently reminds us that it is not possible to specify all of them and it is easy to make mistakes.​[53]​ In the discussion of the mean Aristotle warns us that some extremes resemble the mean and may fool us, that we have a tendency to misperceive one extreme as opposed to the mean, that natural inclinations color how we view the extremes in relation to the mean, that we are likely to go wrong when judging pleasure and pain and that we must become self-aware, guarding against our own failings.​[54]​ It is also interesting to note that as there are many ways of going wrong identifying them cannot be a matter for a rule to capture, but must rest with perception, a faculty which requires reason and emotion to co-operate. Aristotle also draws our attention to the possibility of holding out against strong emotion as long as we see it coming and have time to prepare for it,​[55]​ leaving open the possibility that some emotions will ‘creep up’ on us unawares and their influence will not be accessible to reason. 
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